This book marks a total departure from previous studies of the Boxer War. It evaluates the way the war was perceived and portrayed at the time by the mass media. As such the book offers insights to a wider audience than that of sinologists or Chinese historians. The important distinction made by the author is between image makers and eyewitnesses. Whole categories of powerful image makers, both Chinese and foreign, never saw anything of the Boxer War but were responsible for (...) disseminating images of that war to millions of people in China and throughout the world. (shrink)

An Old and continuing tendency amongst critics of Kant's thought on ethics has been to maintain that since the categorical imperative merely provides a formal condition for the rightness of actions – that the principle of the action be universalizable without contradiction – it is inadequate as a test for the rightness of actions. Such critics as Hegel, Mill, and recently, R.P. Wolff, have suggested the same fundamental objection to Kant's doctrine: the requirement that a maxim be universalizable is formally (...) compatible with any action whatsoever being right. (shrink)

Um das Recht zu erfassen, bedarf es der Beachtung der Beziehung zwischen Recht und Anarchie. Anarchie kann mit oder ohne Gesetze bestehen, die das Verhalten der Menschen regeln. Das Privatrecht enthält diejenigen Gesetze, die den Zustand der Anarchie von einem gesetzlosen Zustand in einen mit Recht umwandeln können. Diese Gesetze sind die natürlichen Gesetze, die das Mein und Dein, insbesondere die Rechte der Person, das Eigentumsrecht, das Vertragsrecht, das Recht der häuslichen Gesellschaft und die korrespondierenden Verbindlichkeiten bestimmen. Das Problem mit (...) einem Naturzustand, der Privatrecht enthält, ist, wie die Tendenz zum Ausarten in Gesetzlosigkeit und allgemeinen Krieg zum Halten zu bringen ist, weil in einem solchen Zustand kein objektiver Prozeß da ist, in dem Bestimmtheit über die Rechte in dem äußeren Verhalten des Menschen erreicht und erzwungen werden kann. Die Gefahr des privatrechtlichen Naturzustands ist, in die Anarchie ohne rechtliche Gesetze abzugleiten. Die Urteile des Privatrechts enthalten unvermeidliche Abhängigkeit von den subjektiven, wenngleich vernünftigen, Annahmen über die Absichten der Handelnden der gesetzmäßigen Taten und auch unvermeidliche Annahmen über die rechtlichen Absichten der Tatsachen. Aber diesen Urteilen fehlt es an der Bedingung der gewissen und peremtorischen Urteile. Der Grund des öffentlichen Rechts ist es, daß die Bedingungen eines Gerichtshofs, also der Gewißheit und Endgültigkeit der Urteile über das Mein und Dein durch die Kraft eines Beherrschers und die Gesetze eines Gesetzgebers allein eingehalten werden können. Das öffentliche Recht ist besonders nötig, um die Ungewißheit über das Eigentum aufzulösen, und, was im Naturzustand nur provisorische Rechte sind, zu peremtorischen zu machen. Der bürgerliche Zustand ist nicht ein Zustand unter bloß positiven Gesetzen. Die natürlichen Gesetze werden in irgendeiner Art in jedem bürgerlichen Zustand entdeckt. Sie machen das Wesen der verschiedenen Rechte aus. Die Differenz zwischen den beiden Arten von Recht liegt nicht in den Gesetzen, sondern in dem komparativen Vermögen, im Naturzustand und im bürgerlichen Zustand einen Gerichtshof auszumachen und ein allgemein verbindendes Urteil zu erreichen. Diese Differenz hängt ab von der Art, in der die Kraft in den Bestimmungen der Rechte ausgemacht und gebraucht ist, also von dem Vermögen des bürgerlichen Zustands, peremtorische Rechte zu bestimmen und der Auflösung in die gesetzlose Anarchie zu widerstehen. (shrink)

Cells express many proteins that bind to laminin, the major adhesive component of basement membranes. Some of these, specifically integrins, function as transmembrane receptors that ‘signal’ the presence of laminin on the cell surface to the cytoplasm. Lectins constitute a second class of laminin binding proteins that may augment integrin function by interacting with laminin carbohydrate. Caution must be used in ascribing functions to other laminin binding proteins, especially cytosolic proteins.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 535 second English volume), Ratzinger's Behold the Prerced One (pp. 1345 ), and W. Kasper's Theology and Church (pp. 94-108; Kasper says simply, "Rahner's characterization of neo-Chalcedonianism is historicaly inaccurate," p. 214, note 18). As it is, Ols's treatment reminds us that Rahner's own writings, which overlooked the later Councils of Constantinople, presume that Chalcedon had been the end of a development in Christology; this inaccurate presumption (...) has dominated too much of the writing which has followed Rahner's essay. Ols returns to this problem of " latent monophysitism " in some classical christologies in the final chapters of his work (VIII-XI). With a careful examination of the christology of Aquinas, the author skillfully demonstrates the rich development of Christ's true humanity that is possible within the classical approach; he deals specifically with the topics of Christ's knowledge, his sinlessness, and the concept of person. (It is interesting to note that, like Rahner and others before and after, Ols thinks that the word "person" is not particularly felicitous and would prefer simply the word hypostasis or subsistence [p. 187]. His wish is likely to have no more success than previous suggestions in this regard.) Although limited in its intent, this hook is rich in many ways. Ols's knowledge of St. Thomas is deep, and he uses that knowledge well. His critique of Rahner and Schilleheeckx may he forceful in its negative assertions, hut I believe it is accurate in pointing out the philosophical idealism that underlies much of their christological writings. This idealism is too often overlooked and needs the corrective of what we might call "Mediterranean realism." Although his criticism may he incisive, it is never unfair or strident, and he is aware of the positive insights that these men have contributed to our continuing reflections on the Lord. By intent, Ols's work is essentially one of evaluation and criticism. Nevertheless, the chapters that reflect on (and develop) Aquinas's teaching and give a positive presentation of the real human· ity of the Lord lead one to hope that the author will follow this study with a fully elaborated christology. St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie Yonkers, New York JAMES T. O'CONNOR Kant's System of Rights. By LESLIE A. MULHOLLAND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Pp. xvii + 434. $49.00. Several good hooks on Kant's political philosophy have appeared in the past decade, hut the literature on Kant's political philosophy is still both slimmer and weaker than on any other aspect of his thought. 536 BOOK REVIEWS Though we still await a definitive study of the topic, this book goes a long way toward filling some important gaps. Even the best books on Kant's political philosophy tend to treat only the broad outlines of Kant's position, shying away from detailed exposition of Kant's theories of individual right and external possession and of the political theory based on them. Mulholland's is not only the most detailed but also the most persuasive account of these matters which has yet been presented in English. The book's first four chapters attempt to lay the foundations for Kant's political philosophy through a general discussion of his ethical theory. The main function of these (somewhat overlong) introductory chapters is to argue for a tension between the law of nature formula (which Mulholland prefers as a guide to Kant's theory of right) and the formula of humanity as end in itself. According to Mulholland, the law of nature formula leads to a theory of rights and political obliga· tion which places Kant in the natural law tradition, whereas the formula of humanity commits him to what Mulholland calls the " deed principle ": that acquired rights can come about only through a deed on the part of those having the duties corresponding to the rights through which these duties have been assumed. Mulholland argues that if we take the deed principle strictly, then we must base political obligation on consent and thus on a social contract. The burden of Mulholland's argument throughout the book is that Kant cannot sustain the deed principle, and it is... (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.

The focus of this article is J. Leslie Mitchell’s Spartacus (1933), his fictional representation of the slave rebellion in ancient Rome led by the eponymous gladiator. The article begins by examining Mitchell’s contribution to debates over the role of the revolutionary writer in Left Review in the mid-1930s and his place in the British Left in this era, before going on to survey the ways in which the figure of Spartacus and the German Spartacists are represented across Mitchell’s oeuvre. (...) It then explores key source material utilized in the writing of the novel, as well as outlining comparisons between Mitchell’s representation of Spartacus and those of his fellow novelists Howard Fast and Arthur Koestler. Including close readings of Spartacus and informed by archival research and previously unpublished manuscript items, the article argues that at the same time as denouncing the cruelties of Roman rule, Spartacus also signals Mitchell’s passionate opposition to what he considered the violent histories of oppression suffered by the commons of the earth of all times, culminating in the capitalist crisis of Mitchell’s own period in the 1930s. Mitchell creates this effect of historical simultaneity by writing a work of myth-history – as opposed to historical realism or political propaganda – that employs the utopian legend of the Golden Age to inspire radical dissent against modern deprivation. (shrink)

"The essays, both philosophical and historical, demonstrate the continuing significance of a neglected aspect of Kant’s thought."—Religious Studies Review Challenging the traditional view that Kant's account of religion was peripheral to his thinking, these essays demonstrate the centrality of religion to Kant's critical philosophy. Contributors are Sharon Anderson-Gold, Leslie A. Mulholland, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., Philip J. Rossi, Joseph Runzo, Denis Savage, Walter Sparn, Burkhard Tuschling, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, and Allen W. Wood.

This article reviews the book "Kant's System of Rights," by Leslie A. Mulholland.

The present narrative review seeks to unravel where we are now, and where we need to go to delineate the active ingredients in psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents (e.g., chatbots). While psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents has shown promising effectiveness for depression, anxiety, and psychological distress across several randomized controlled trials, little emphasis has been placed on the therapeutic processes in these interventions. The theoretical framework of this narrative review is grounded in prominent perspectives on the active ingredients in psychotherapy. (...) Based on search terms derived from various theoretical perspectives, we conducted a systematic literature search of four scientific databases and identified 17 studies. Across the selected studies, three themes emerged: relationship variables, emotional venting, and cognitive factors. While methodological issues compromise the epistemic value of this evidence base, core questions also remain to be answered. Such questions include, but are not limited to, whether humans can form affectionate bonds to inanimate beings and whether these kind of mental health treatments should be understood as psychotherapy or something else. Researchers should therefore be cautious when applying theories of psychotherapy in the realm of conversational agents. We conclude the paper by introducing recommendations for future research, which we hope will help instigate methodologically sound studies in this field. (shrink)

Focusing on the concept of freedom, Leslie Paul Thiele makes Heidegger's philosophical works speak directly to politics in a postmodern world. Neither excusing Heidegger for his political sins nor ignoring their lesson, Thiele nonetheless refrains from polemic in order creatively to engage one of the greatest philosophers of our time. The product of this engagement is a vindication of a democratic and ecological politics firmly grounded in philosophic inquiry. Using Heidegger's understanding of freedom as a point of departure, Timely (...) Meditations lays out the philosophic and political nature and potential of freedom in thought, speech, and deed. This disclosive freedom is contrasted to both modern (positive and negative) and postmodern (Nietzschean and Foucaultian) variations. The result is an original and provocative study that challenges our present understanding of liberty while underlining dangerous collusion with the contemporary forces of technology. Timely Meditations marks an increasingly rare achievement today. For unlike many theorists who attempt to steer a course into the world of postmodern politics, Thiele does so without forsaking philosophic foundations and without abandoning practical hopes and tasks for rhetorical diversions. Originally published in 1995. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This is the penultimate draft of a paper originally presented at the Hart-Fuller at 50 conference, held at the NYU Law School in February 2008. A revised version will appear in the NYU Law Review. The paper seeks to clarify and assess HLA Hart's famous claim that legal positivism somehow involves a 'separation of law and morals.' The paper contends that Hart's 'separability thesis should not be confused with the 'social thesis,' with the 'sources thesis,' or with a methodological thesis (...) about jurisprudence. Hart's thesis denies the existence of necessary (conceptual) connections between law and morality. But that thesis is false: there are many necessary connections between law and morality, some of them conceptually significant. Among these is an important negative connection: law is of its nature morally fallible and morally risky. Lon Fuller emphasised the 'internal morality of law,' the 'morality that makes law possible'. Hart stressed that there is also an immorality that law makes possible. Law's nature is seen not only in its internal virtues, in legality, but also in its internal vices, in legalism. (shrink)

From the introductory chapter. The distinctions taken between the necessary and the contingent, in philosophical discussion no less than in common life, are ordinarily supposed to be so definitive and are permitted so deeply to influence our conceptions that it seems well worth one's while to examine them in their origin. And the Aristotelian system will best serve our purpose as a corpus vile for very obvious reasons. In the first place, Aristotle is the earliest systematic philosopher who essayed to (...) treat consistently of all the greater problems of life and thought, and whose works remain to be studied. His method, too, was such that, standing as he did just on the verge of formalism, the definitions which he attempted still bear definite traces of the purely functional meaning of those terms, while his formulation of their significance has led naturally to their solidification as objective facts in the world. For Aristotle was wont to preface his own conclusions by inquiring, rather superficially to be sure, into the psychology of the conceptions in question ; yet, while the inadequacy of his psychology is now admitted on all hands, the inferences as to fact which he deduced therefrom are even now in part accepted as conclusive. When one reflects upon it this state of the question strikes one as absurd. For this reason there appears to be the greater justification for an analysis of the presuppositions on which these conceptions rest. If one grants their validity, the conclusions and the resultant contradictions of the system must be accepted as ultimate. But I am convinced that Aristotle's presuppositions and his real problems were wholly unreconcilable with each other, and so his contradictions serve all the better to point out the direction in which their solution lay. Plato made the acute observation that surprise is the beginning of philosophy, and Aristotle appropriated and further applied the thought.' The full sweep of the truth contained in these words is vastly greater, however, than they knew. The feeling of wonder is indeed the point of departure for philosophy ; but what precisely does it mean? It indicates first of all that an old habit has been broken up. Old conceptions, like the proverbial old bottles, have become so surcharged with the new wine of meaning that they have burst. But to say this is to describe the phenomenon merely as A brute fact without according it any symbolic value. This state of surprise must acquire an ideal worth, an indicative function, if it is really to become the parent of philosophy. Briefly, then, we may say : surprise indicates the need of reconstructing our supposed facts. And this statement is to be taken at its full value, with all its implications, if philosophy is to be achieved.... (shrink)

Leslie Stephen (1832–1904) was a writer, philosopher and literary critic whose work was published widely in the nineteenth century. As a young man Stephen was ordained deacon, but he later became agnostic and much of his work reflects his interest in challenging popular religion. This two-volume work, first published in 1876, is no exception: it focuses on the eighteenth-century deist controversy and its effects, as well as the reactions to what Stephen saw as a revolution in thought. Comprehensive and (...) full of detailed analysis, this is an important work in the history of ideas. Volume 2 focuses on eighteenth-century moral philosophy, political philosophy and literature, and on the literary and religious reactions to the revolution in thought. Utilitarianism is discussed at length, as well as the work of thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Burke and Adam Smith. (shrink)

In "De l’Allemagne", Mme de Staël develops a sophisticated philosophical psychology that centers not on reason, but imagination. She does this by bringing French Enlightenment philosophy, particularly Rousseau and Diderot, into dialogue with German thinkers, including Kant and Herder. For Mme de Staël, imagination transcends the epistemic limits of sensibility and reason by incorporating sentiment.

Sir Leslie Stephen (1832–1904), the founding editor of the Dictionary of National Biography, and a writer on philosophy, ethics, and literature, was educated at Eton, King's College London and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he remained as a fellow and a tutor for a number of years. Though a sickly child, he later became a keen and successful mountaineer, taking part in first ascents of nine peaks in the Alps. In 1871 he became editor of the Cornhill Magazine. During his (...) eleven-year tenure, he wrote two successful books on ethics, including The Science of Ethics in 1892, which was widely adopted as a standard textbook. This two-volume work, which was first published in 1896, brings together the lectures he gave to various ethical societies, mostly in London. Both volumes examine the ethical issues surrounding a range of topics including politics, morality, duty, and crime and punishment. (shrink)

Lawyers and philosophers have long debated whether law should enforce social morality. This paper explores whether law should improve social morality. It explains how this might be possible, and what sort of obstacles, factual and moral, there are to doing so. It concludes with an example: our law should attempt to improve our social morality of sexual conduct.

Many Faculties of Education in the UK and elsewhere have ‘social justice’ written into their mission statements. But are they concerned by questions of social justice in education, or has the term become somewhat vacuous and devoid of substantive meaning? The present article subjects recent discourses about social justice in education to scrutiny and finds them wanting in various respects, in particular when juxtaposed with historical accounts of justice by philosophers such as Aristotle or Aquinas. Among the complaints made here (...) is that most educational accounts (a) make do with a ‘negative’ conception of social justice as focused on specific cases of injustices without any positive conception of what social justice means in its entirety, (b) foreground institutional justice at the expense of justice as a moral or civic virtue, (c) fail to connect the identification of justice or injustice to an account of phronesis or practical wisdom for integrating values, (d) shy away from associating social justice with the ‘common good’ and (e) fail to get to grips with some thorny normative questions about the role of justice in the ordering of goods in a hierarchy towards the highest good. Along the way, various remedies are suggested. (shrink)

In this article I re-examine the well-known distinction between rootedness and uprootedness that Emmanuel Levinas draws in his short text “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us” (1961). This distinction addresses the relation between men and place either as an attachment to place (paganism, Heidegger) or as a freedom with regard to place (Judaism, Gagarin). I question this opposition from a contemporary perspective in environmental philosophy, namely from the growing awareness of the interconnectedness between place and Earth. I contend that this new perspective (...) changes the understanding of dwelling today because of Earth’s exteriority with regard to place. I argue that this exteriority is neither infinite nor a totality. (shrink)

In this paper I contrast conceptions of self from two perspectives: an individualistic orientation and a communitarian approach. In doing so, the philosophical justification is Wittgenstein’s idea that individualism is produced and reinforced as a way of being, thinking and interacting in community. With this contextual frame, I argue that we are shaped by the language practices of our community to ascribe meaning and interpret our own relationships with others through our language lexicon and grammar. To illustrate the communitarian perspective (...) I refer to Māori perspectives in which connectedness is axiomatic: in particular the concepts of whanaungatanga and whakapapa, as described by Ka’ai and Metge. On the basis that such concepts are predicated on language use, I suggest that we can learn the grammar of engagement in a discursive context that emphasises connectedness just as easily as in one which is founded on separateness. I argue that interacting with an other is to engage with the ideas, beliefs, and values that shape their language, even as we expose our own. Engaging between individualistic and communitarian understandings is presented as learning to bridge language gaps between different social constructs and understandings of reality. (shrink)

In this paper I contrast conceptions of self from two perspectives: an individualistic orientation and a communitarian approach. In doing so, the philosophical justification is Wittgenstein’s idea that individualism is produced and reinforced as a way of being, thinking and interacting in community. With this contextual frame, I argue that we are shaped by the language practices of our community to ascribe meaning and interpret our own relationships with others through our language lexicon and grammar. To illustrate the communitarian perspective (...) I refer to Māori perspectives in which connectedness is axiomatic: in particular the concepts of whanaungatanga and whakapapa, as described by Ka’ai and Metge. On the basis that such concepts are predicated on language use, I suggest that we can learn the grammar of engagement in a discursive context that emphasises connectedness just as easily as in one which is founded on separateness. I argue that interacting with an other is to engage with the ideas, beliefs, and values that shape their language, even as we expose our own. Engaging between individualistic and communitarian understandings is presented as learning to bridge language gaps between different social constructs and understandings of reality. (shrink)

Table 3 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

Qual o lugar da política em nossas modernas sociedades capitalistas? De que política se trata? Como a democracia deve se haver com uma economia que provoca riqueza gerando desigualdades insalubres? Essas são algumas das questões sobre as quais se debruçam os filósofos José Arthur Giannotti e Luiz Damon Moutinho em Os limites da política. Instigado pelo alcance e profundidade do e-book A política no limite do pensar, de Giannotti, publicado pela Companhia das Letras em 2014, Luiz Damon reagiu escrevendo (...) um ensaio em que refletia sobre as bases filosóficas dos argumentos do colega. As provocações de Damon levaram Giannotti a acentuar ou corrigir algumas de suas ideias. Os limites da política nasceu de um intenso debate entre os dois filósofos, com réplicas e tréplicas, agora reunidas em um só volume juntamente ao ensaio original que deu origem à polêmica. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of “livity,” the ground of Rastafari subjectivity. In its multifaceted nuances, “livity” represents the Rastafari invention of a religious tradition and discourse, whose ethos was fundamentally sacred, signified the immanence of the Absolute in dialectic with the Rastafari worldview and life world. Innovatively, the Rastafari coined the term “livity” to a discourse to combat despair, damnation, social death, and the existential chaos-monde they referred to as Babylon. In the process, the Rastafari reclaimed their power to (...) name their world. The Rastafari neologism “livity” articulated a mysticism, alternative spatial visions, and a positive technology of the self that revalorized blackness, explored, and interrogated profound dimensions of the human condition, from within the Jamaican context, that inevitably brought them into conflict with the local colonial authorities and implicitly shifted the model of social relations between the master and slave. (shrink)